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Communist Chinese Attitudes Toward
United Nations Membership 1945-1971
An Essay
VICTORIA E. DocAuER
As is known to all, China is one of the founding members of the
United Nations. In 1949 the Chinese people overthrew the reactionary
rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and founded the People's Republic
of China.
Since then the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations should
have gone to the People's Republic of China as a matter of course.
It was only bcause of the obstruction by the United States that the
People's Republic of China was deprived of its legitimate rights for a
long time and that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, long repudiated by the
Chinese people, was able to usurp China's lawful seat in the United Nations.
This was a gross interference in China's internal affairs as well as a
willful trampling on the Charter of the United Nations. Now such an
unjustifiable state of affairs has finally been put right....
Chiao Kuan-hua, Delegate CPR to UN'
So began the maiden speech of the delegate of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations. Chiao spoke of an issue which had remained unresolved
for almost a quarter of a century, an issue which can still create controversy.
Let us here examine the question of Communist Chinese representation in the
United Nations in the context of a broader question: the attitude of Communist
China toward international law. Was it only United States interference which
kept Communist China out of the United Nations? What is the position of
Communist China in regard to international law? Has the People's Republic been
the lawless nation that it is sometimes described to be? In an attempt to provide
questions, one must examine those arguments which emphasize the lawlessness
of Communist China and seek to determine the attitude of the Communist Chinese
toward the United Nations, an organization which as a whole bows to the
traditionally accepted principles of international law.
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Just cause may be shown for the opinion that the People's Republic of China
(hereafter referred to as the CPR) has chosen to violate international law.
First, the CPR refuses to recognize treaties of an "aggressive or enslaving nature."
Treaties made under unequal conditions or containing unequal provisions are
subject to repudiation. Certain of these treaties are: the Sino-British Treaty of
Nanking (1942); the Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun (1958); the Treaties of
Tientsin (1959); and Peking (1860) with Britain, France, the United States, and
Russia; the Sino-Russian Treaty of Ili (1881); the Protocol of Lisbon (1887);
the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895); the Sino-British Convention
for the Extension of Hong Kong (1898); and the International Protocol (1901)
signed with eight foreign powers following the Boxer Uprising.' Yet the CPR
has proclaimed that the status quo should be maintained pending negotiation.
Evidently not every treaty which is repudiable is to be repudiated.3
Second, the Communists seized alien property in China. In December 1950,
the Chinese seized United States property and froze American funds, both public
and private, in mainland China. United States properties in the domain of
the CPR could not be transferred or disposed of without the approval of the
People's Government. Moreover, between 1951 and 1952 Peking "requisitioned"
the properties of the Asiatic Petroleum Company and the Shell Company, both
British firms; two British dockyards at Shanghai; the land belonging to the
British-owned Shanghai and Tientsin Race Course Companies; and some houses and
building land owned by British nationals. The measure was not to affect the
real estate occupied by the Asiatic Petroleum Company, and the Chinese
Government was supposed to purchase all of the company's petroleum stock in
China.5 Yet the British Government claims that much British property was seized
without compensation. Many foreign firms have been forced into debt by means
of high taxes, fines, contrived labor disputes, etc.6
Third, the Communist Chinese have shown a great disrespect for diplomatic
and consular immunities in the past. In March, 1949, Mao had instructed the
cadres that upon entering the cities they should refuse to recognize the legal status
of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel, abolish all imperialist
propaganda agencies in China, take control of foreign trade, and reform the
customs system.7 Between 1949 and 1953 the CPR dealt harshly with foreign
diplomats and consular personnel. Americans in particular were subjected to
harassment. The United States consul at Urumchi, D.S. Mackiernan, was charged
with spying in 1949; he had allegedly supplied funds to three Sinkiang chieftains
with the purpose of encouraging resistance to the Communist take-over.' Similar
charges were leveled against the counsul-general in Mukden, Angus Ward.
Furthermore, he and four of his associates were jailed on October 24, 1949, on
charges of having assaulted a Chinese employee.9 Both Makiernan and Ward were
allowed to leave China shortly afterward, however. And as China's diplomatic
contacts widened, her treatment of diplomatic personnel softened. Not until
1966 did Peking revert to its former hard-line stance. At that time, the Chinese
attempted to hold the Netherlands charge d'affairs as a hostage to ensure the
return of a Chinese scientific delegation which was attending a conference in
the Netherlands. Fortunately, a compromise settled the issue.
Yet other cases involving the detention of aliens in China have occurred
since 1949. It has been suggested that a traditional Chinese suspicion of strangers
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in their midst may have led to the spy charges leveled against aliens in China.'0
Thus United States military pilots who strayed over China while on Vietnam duty
have been held prisoner, as have businessmen, missionaries, and others. At least
three Americans held over a long period of time were still in prison in China
in 1971. One was a pilot officially listed as a civilian employee of the United States
Army, who was lost while flying from Korea to Japan. The Chinese claimed
he was an intelligence agent who was dropping supplies to anti-Communist rebels.
The other two were United States military pilots who strayed over China
while on Vietnam duty.''
The aggressive behavior of China toward its neighbors is also often cited.
Obviously, the blame for the Korean War has been laid on the doorstep of the CPR.
Referring to the Yearbook of the United Nations, one notes that a majority of
the nations represented in the United Nations considered that the Chinese
Communists rejected all cease-fire proposals regarding Korea in 1951.12 The report
of the United Nations Cease-Fire Group (see appendix) suggesting a five-point
program to achieve a cease-fire in Korea, the establishment of a free and united
Korea, and a settlement of the Far Eastern problems, was met with counter-
proposals on the part of the Chinese. Twenty-four nations, including the United
States, felt that the attitude of the CPR toward negotiation was entirely negative;
they noted that adopting China's counter-proposals would mean that neither
North Korea nor Communist China had been guilty of aggression and that
the Security Council and the General Assembly had been mistaken in defending the
Republic of Korea. The consensus was that the United Nations had been given
an ultimatum demanding that it refute its principles. (The text of the Chinese
proposals may be seen on page 19).
The Indian border dispute is also used to point out China's disregard for peace,
for the Chinese Communists constructed a motor road running into territory
claimed by India. The Indian Government objected, noting the possibility that
this road might be used for military purposes. Clashes occurred between Chinese
and Indian troops, and the Indian Government accused China of deliberate
aggression in 1959. Conditions worsened after the Tibetan revolt and minor
fighting flared into massive action when CPR forces attacked Indian outposts
in October of 1962.13
It is held that China has not adhered to the principles of the United Nations
Charter. Thus some have questioned the seriousness of the Communist Chinese
bids for United Nations representation. Robert Blum states in The United States
and China in World Affairs:
There has always been a question as to whether the Chinese Communists
wanted to be in the United Nations on any terms. Some maintain that
Peking's leaders may not have wanted to subject themselves to the discipline
of the world organization because they may feel that they enjoy greater
freedom of action as a non-member-specifically, because they may believe
that they can use their absence from the United Nations as a means of
mobilizing support for themselves and their policies in other bodies,
especially those consisting solely of Communist or Afro-Asian members,
and that their absence permits them to avoid votes in the United Nations
which might cause them embarrassment in their relations with one nation
or another. . .
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And Lincoln P. Bloomfield in "China, the United States, and the United Nations"
notes that Peking made the following admission regarding the entrance of Communist
China into the United Nations:
.-.N..we cannot have a majority in voting; formally the difficult
situation may be moderated to some extent, but the struggle that arises will
be more violent and we shall lose our present freedom of action.1"
Yet there is much evidence to show that the CPR has always been serious in
its desire for United Nations membership. Ever pragmatic, China could not afford
to ignore international law completely because of the foreign policy needs it
could serve.
As early as 1945 the Communist Party of China pressed for representation
in the San Francisco Conference. Ambassador Hurley noted in a telegram to
Secretary of State Stettinius dated February 19, 1945, that he had received a
message from General Chou En-lai requesting that the Communist Party be included
in the planned United Nations Conference. Chou claimed that the people of China
could not be truly represented by a Kuomintang delegation only.
We consider furthermore that the representatives of the Kuomintang
should be limited to one-third of the delegation. . . . The other two-thirds of
the delegation should be sent by the Communist Party and the Democratic
Federation. Only then can the common will of the Chinese people be
fairly represented. . . ."
Again, in a telegram dated February 20, 1945 from the Charge in China (Atcheson)
to the Secretary of State, Atcheson noted that the Yenan Emancipation Daily
editorial pressed for Communist Chinese representation in the world organization.
It is honor to Chinese people to be invited to sponsor United Nations
Conference at San Francisco on April 25, editorial said. 'This is result
of 71/2 years of war of Chinese people against Japanese invaders, especially
of heroic fighting of army and people of liberated areas and behind
enemy lines. But though we are among United Nations there is up till
now no democratic coalition government able to represent all classes
and strata of entire Chinese nation and all party groups. .
Still again, on March 12, 1945, Atcheson telegraphed Stettinius that he had received
another message from Chou En-lai pressing for Communist Chinese representation
at the April conference." President Roosevelt was prompted to send a message
to Chiang Kai-shek, directing his attention to the advantages of allowing a
Communist Chinese delegation in the United Nations Conference. Chiang, of course,
could not be persuaded thus easily, and only the Kuomintang delegation was
granted representation. By 1946 the Communist Chinese were still protesting the
illegality of the Kuomintant delegation. A Yenan Emancipation Daily editorial
of October 23, 1946, emphasized that the
... so-called Chinese delegation to UNO Assembly only represents
dictator Chiang Kai-shek and his clique and not the Chinese people,
who would not be responsible for action and words of Chiang Kai-shek's
representatives betraying Chinese national interests at UNO Assembly.19
Once in power, the CPR sent telegram after telegram to the United Nations,
asserting the illegality of the representatives of the Nationalist Government in
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the United Nations and expressing a desire for United Nations membership.
Byron S. Weng notes in "Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the
United Nations" that between October 1, 1949, and June 30, 1950, Peking sent nine
cablegrams to the various organs of the United Nations and nine to the related
international agencies, all of them concerning Chinese representation. 20
In a cablegram dated November 18, 1949 to the President of the General
Assembly, the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China stated that his Government repudiated the legal status of the
delegation under Mr. T. F. Tsiang and that it had no right to speak on behalf
of the Chinese people in the United Nations.2 In another telegram dated
January 8, 1950, the Chinese Foreign Minister again asserted the illegality of
the Kuomintant delegation and asked that it be expelled from the United Nations."
A cablegram dated August 26, 1950, from the Foreign Minister of China to
the Secretary General of the United Nations recalled previous notes sent by China
asking for the expulsion of the Kuomintang delegation from the United Nations
organs. It was stated that the rightful claims of the CPR were being disregarded,
a violation of the United Nations Charter." Finally, in a cablegram dated
September 18, 1950, the Chinese Foreign Minister declared that "should the fifth
session of the General Assembly be held without the participation of his
Government's delegation, all the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning
China would be illegal, null, and void.""
In 1950, the Communist Chinese were inclined to view the international
situation in simple terms; they saw the United Nations as a battleground where
support could be sought and won. Soviet support was apparent, of course, and
India was also ready to support the new China. On September 19, 1950, the
Representative of India stated that his Government had recognized the CPR toward
the end of 1949. To quote from the Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950;
India's advocacy of the claims of new China to be represented in the
United Nations was antecedent to and in no way connected with the
Korean conflict. India had recognized the new government because to
the best of its knowledge it was a sound and stable Government. It had
followed the criteria of recognition in international law: 'habitual
obedience of the bulk of the population with a reasonable expectancy
of permanence.'
However, 1950 saw a change in Chinese attitudes. During the Korean War,
the CPR heard threats from the United States made in the name of the United
Nations. A re-examination of the United Nations led the Communist Chinese
to the conclusion that there were two United Nations organizations: the United
Nations of the Charter and the United Nations dominated by the United States.
The Communists sought to terminate hostilities in Korea by negotiation,
but could not agree to the proposals made by the United Nations Cease-Fire Group.
Of course, in a cablegram dated December 22, 1950, the CPR had made known
its stand that one of the requirements for a peaceful settlement in Korea was
that the representative of the CPR must obtain a legitimate status in the United
Nations.26 This stipulation was evidently ignored by the Cease-Fire Group.
The Chinese made the following suggestions:
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I. If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from
Korea were accepted and put into practice, the Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China would assume the responsibility of
advising the Chinese volunteers to return to China.
II. Measures for the conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful
solution of the Korean problem could be carried out in two states:
First: A cease-fire for a limited period could be agreed upon at the
first meeting of the Seven-Nation Conference and put into effect so that
negotiations could proceed further.
Second: In order that the war in Korea might be brought to an end
completely and peace in the Far East assured, all conditions for the
conclusion of hostilities would have to be discussed in connection with the
political problems, in order to reach agreement on the following points:
Steps and measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Korea; proposals to the Korean people on the steps and measures to
effect the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people
themselves; withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and
the Straits of Taiwan in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam declarations;
other Far Eastern problems.
III. The definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's
Republic of China in the United Nations had to be ensured."
Again, China had the support of India, whose representative stressed that
India "was not convinced that the participation of Chinese forces in the fighting
in Korea was due to any aggressive intention. It was more probably due to its fears
for the territorial integrity of China."" Yet twenty-four representatives felt that
the Chinese had rejected "peace with justice."
From 1950-1953 the international environment was cold to Peking, as can
be seen in the United Nations voting records. (See tables A & B). Yet Peking
continued to send cablegrams to the United Nations-an indication that it did
indeed take the organization seriously.
1954-57 saw still another modification of Chinese policy. At that time,
China wanted to become the champion of the new forces developing in the
world. Peking supported the United Nations Charter in its dealings with
underdeveloped countries; it wanted to appear amicable." The doctrine of peaceful
coexistence was exploited; when the CPR Constitution was adopted in 1954 the
principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for each other's
sovereignty and territorial integrity were declared to be the basis of the CPR's
relations with foreign nations. These in turn gave rise to the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence which were formulated in the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement
of April 29, 1954. They are:
I. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
II. Nonaggression
III. Noninterference in each other's internal affairs
IV. Equality and mutual benefit
V. Peaceful coexistence.30
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Peaceful coexistence was to be the weapon used to form a united front against
the United States. At the same time, Peking adopted a watch and wait policy
regarding the United Nations. Expanding UN membership might give Communist
China its opportunity for representation in the world organization. An editorial
in Jen-min Jih-pao said on September 24, 1955: "Make no mistake: the lawful
right of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations will be restored.
All efforts to deny the Chinese people such rights will lead nowhere. She will
play an increasingly important part in world affairs. . .a."3
A renewed hard line became apparent in 1958. China felt stronger; the
new military balance was more favorable to the Communist world. The Soviet
break-through in missiles in 1957 and the success of the first Five-Year Plan
gave China renewed confidence; the "Great Leap Forward" was planned to
replace the more modest Second Five-Year Plan. China also felt that its
indictment as an aggressor in Korea could be forgotten; it had been carrying
on diplomatic meetings on an ambassadorial level with the United States in
Geneva since August 1, 1955." China wanted to move to command the
under-developed world now that it was no longer on the defensive. The Chinese
adopted a more arrogant attitude, which could be seen in their relations with the
United Nations. The General Assembly's adoption of a resolution condemning
China of violating the fundamental freedoms and human rights of the Tibetan
people caused China ill-feeling." An editorial of Kuang-ming lih-pao scorned the
United Nations resolution and pointed out the position of the Negro in American
TABLE A
VOTE ON COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE U.N.
Year Membership For A gainst A bstentions A bsent
1950 59 16 33 10 0
1951 60 11 37 4 no roll call
1952 60 7 42 11 0
1953 60 10 44 2 4
1954 60 11 43 6 0
1955 60 12 42 6 0
1956 79 24 47 8 0
1957 82 27 48 6 1
1958 81 28 44 9 0
1959 82 29 44 9 0
1960 98 34 42 22 0
1961 104 36 48 20 0
1962 110 42 56 12 0
1963 111 41 57 12 1
1964 no vote taken
1965 117 47 47 20 3
1966 121 46 57 17 1
1967 122 45 58 17 2
1968 126 44 58 23 1
1969 126 48 56 21 1
See: Communist China: A Bibliographic Survey, 1971 (Dept. of the Army)
Table taken from Issues in United States Foreign Policy, No. 4- Communist China,
John Kimball, Ed. (Dept. of State, 1969)
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Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TABLE B (a)
Not to
Consider Abstention Absent
Total UN
Member- To
ship Consider
60 11 (18.7%)
60 7 (11.7%)
60 10 (16.7%)
60 11 (18.3%)
60 12 (20% )
79 24 (30.4%)
82 27 (32.9%)
81b 28 (34.6%)
82 29 (35.4%)
98 34 (34.7%)
(61% )
(70% )
(73.3%)
(71.7%)
(70% )
(59.4%)
(58.6%)
(54.3%)
(53.7%)
(42.9%)
4
11
2
6
6
8
6
9
9
22
no roll call
0
4
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Sponsor
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
India
India
India
India
Soviet Union
From 1951 through 1960 the vote was on a United States proposal not
to put the question on the agenda.
Thereafter placing the item on the agenda was not contested. The Assembly
voted each year to regard the matter as an "important question"
requiring a two-thirds majority. The votes below are on the substantive
question of seating the Communist Chinese delegates and removing
the Nationalist Chinese delegates.
To seat Not to seat
104 36 (34.6%) 48 (46.1%) 20
110 42 (38.7%) 56 (50.9%) 12
111 41 (36.9%) 57 (51.4%) 12
General Assembly session postponed
117 47 (40.2%) 47 (40.2%) 20
1966 121 46 (38% ) 57 (47.1%)
a Adapted from "The China Problem," Intercom, Vol.
b Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic
1
0
1
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Albania
3 Cambodia, Albania,
Algeria, Congo
(Brazzaville), Cuba,
Ghana, Guinea,
Mali, Pakistan,
Rumania, Somalia,
Syria
17 1 (same as 1965
minus Ghana and
Somalia and plus
Mauritania)
7, No. 1, pp. 32-33.
1) Voting to Admit in 1963 (41)
Afghanistan Denmark
Albania Finland
Algeria Ghana
Bulgaria Guinea
Burma Hungary
Burundi India
Byelorussia Indonesia
Cambodia Iraq
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Rumania
Somalia
Sweden
Syria
Tanganyika
Tunisia
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Republic
United Kingdom
21
37
42
44
43
42
47
48
44
44
42
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Ceylon Laos Soviet Union Yemen
Cuba Mali Sudan Yugoslavia
Czechoslovakia
2) Voting to admit in 1965 (47)
The Members listed above with four exceptions and ten additions.
Exceptions: Indonesia-withdrew from the UN in 1965
Laos-did not vote in 1965
Burundi-abstained in 1965
Tunisia-abstained in 1965
Additions: Central African Republic-voted "No" in 1963
Congo (Brazzaville)-voted "No" in 1963
Ethiopia-absent in 1963
France-voted "No" in 1963
Kenya-new Member
Mauritania-abstained in 1963
Nigeria-abstained in 1963
Sierra Leone-abstained in 1963
Singapore-new Member
Zambia-new Member
3) Voting to Admit in 1966 (46)
The changes in 1966 from 1965 were as follows:
Burundi, which abstained in 1965, voted "Yes."
Central African Republic, which voted "Yes" in 1965, voted "No."
Indonesia, which had withdrawn in 1965, voted "Yes."
Morocco, which voted "Yes" in 1965, abstained.
Senegal, which abstained in 1965, voted "Yes."
Sierra Leone, which voted "Yes" in 1965, voted "No."
Singapore, which voted "Yes" in 1965, abstained.
Of the 46 Members maintaining diplomatic relations with Communist China, all voted
for admission in 1966 except:
Laos-absent (also in 1965)
Morocco-abstained (voted "Yes" in 1965)
Netherlands-abstained (also in 1965)
Tunisia-abstained (also in 1965)
Of 58 UN Members maintaining diplomatic relations with Nationalist China in 1966,
48 voted against seating Communist China and expelling the Nationalist delegates
Tables taken from "China, the United States, and the United Nations", International
Organization, Volume XX, Autumn 1966 (Boston: World Peace Foundation), pp.
673-674.
society, commenting that "they have the audacity to talk about human rights and
freedom for the Tibetan."34
At the same time, the United States took the position that the question of
Chinese representation in the United Nations was substantive rather than procedural,
and a two-thirds majority should be required in a vote to seat Communist China.
The Communist Chinese reaction to this was understandably violent; they
denounced this new "United States plot" to keep them out of the UN
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Yet, if Byron S. Weng is correct, they also made offers to negotiate, and
Foreign Minister Chen Yi let it be known that China was willing to talk on the
foreign minister level if the initiative came from Washington. Moreover, it was
indicated that peaceful coexistence was possible if the United States would
no longer block China's entry into the United Nations."
On December 14, 1961, the General Assembly passed the resolution making
the seating of China an "important question." Weng describes the Chinese reaction
in terms of a sour-grapes attitude. China retaliated by claiming that the United
States was afraid of China's international influence. The Chinese also accused
the United States of wanting to occupy Taiwan permanently.
China now felt itself forced to seek an alternative to the United Nations. It
seemed that China hoped to establish a rival organization composed of the
Afro-Asians and led by China itself. Premier Chou declared in January of 1964
that a new, revolutionary United Nations might well be set up in competition with
the organization which was now under the manipulation of United States
imperialism." Early in 1964 Premier Chou En-lai visited the UAR, Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Countries
which extended diplomatic recognition to the CPR at that time included
Tunisia, Kenya, Tanganyika, the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Zambia,
and Senegal. In July 1965, Mauritania also extended diplomatic recognition.
Economic and technical cooperation agreements were concluded with Algeria,
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and the UAR in Africa,
and with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, North Vietnam and Pakistan in Asia."
Evidently Peking had high hopes for a new world organization. However, in 1965-66
Peking experienced a series of reverses which made the idea of a rival UN appear
to be wishful thinking. Ahmed Ben Bella was ousted in June, 1965; an argument
with the new Algerian regime developed, and the proposed Second Afro-Asian
Conference was postponed; there was an upheaval in Indonesia leading to a purge
of the Indoneasian Communist Party and the downfall of Sukarno in March 1966;
Castro turned against Peking; Nkrumah of Ghana was ousted by his people on
February 24; Peking boycotted the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party because
the Kremlin had distributed an anti-Chinese document." China appeared to be in
creasingly isolated. Ironically, China's fortunes advanced in the United Nations;
a vote on Communist Chinese representation resulted in a 47-47 tie.
However, in 1965 Communist China made additional stipulations regarding UN
membership. On September 29, Foreign Minister Chan Yi announced:
The United Nations must rectify its mistakes and undergo a
thorough reorganization and reform. It must admit and correct all its
past mistakes. Among other things, it should cancel its resolution
condemning China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States as the
aggressor; the UN Chaffer must be reviewed and revised jointly by all
countries, big and small; all independent States should be included in
the United Nations; and all imperialist puppets should be expelled.39
Yet by 1970 China was showing a renewed interest in joining the United
Nations. After the Cultural Revolution and the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Canada, Italy, and others, there were frequent reports of China's wish to
gain entrance into the UN.40 On October 25, 1971, the United Nations passed a
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resolution to seat the Communist delegation and to expel the Nationalists, a
resolution which Communist China accepted without mention of its 1965 demands.
It seems that in order to understand the attitude of Communist China toward
the United Nations it is necessary to examine the difficulties encountered by a
revolutionary state when attempting to deal with a traditional legal framework.
It must be noted that there may be a gap between words and deeds; the CPR's
condemnation of a United Nations dominated by the United States did not
necessarily mean that the Chinese Communists were unwilling to work with the UN
As James Hsiung suggests in Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations:
Contrary to general assumptions, states are not necessarily more
disposed to paying lip service to international law than they are ready
to apply it in practice. That may be the case in most instances. But
sometimes, however strange it may seem, it is the opposite. Many new states
have declared themselves not bound by norms in whose making they
have taken no part. Yet, in actual conduct they have shown restraint in
the conscious effort to avoid any direct breach of the norms in question.4 '
Hsiung goes on to state that in international relations "ideology is not and cannot
be the sole determinant of a state's pattern of action and conduct."" Moreover, the
fact that a state rejects certain norms should not necessarily lead one to conclude
that the state is "lawless;" a subjective value judgment is involved.
Basically, it is "the manipulation of international law by status quo
powers" which China scorns." Obligations under international law have usually
been fulfilled by the Chinese government. For example, the terms of trade and fisheries
agreements have generally been met. Ishwer C. Ojha points out the ambivalence of
Communist China and suggests that China respects those aspects of international
law considered to have been negotiated on a just basis, such as the Five Principles.
Ojha further notes that China has been placed in an awkward position; it must
conform to the rules of international law as an "insider" and yet castigate it as
an "outsider." The insecurity of Communist China, resulting from its diplomatic
isolation, has sharpened its grievances against international law. Yet it cannot
afford to do without it.
It is evident that Communist China is willing to utilize the United Nations
as long as it is in its best interests to do so. And China cannot afford to remain
in isolation. Notes Ojha:
The very necessity for survival, communication, trade, influence, and
the protection of national interest demands that a state will sooner or later
have to follow rules which are acceptable to others. No state, not even
Communist China, can do without international law. In the formulation
of treaties, in diplomatic notes of protest and commendation, and in verbal
attacks on nations with which it is in conflict, a nation must invoke
international law. China thus complies with a system which she basically
resents.44
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APPENDIX
CEASE-FIRE GROUP PROPOSAL
1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property, and while other steps are being
taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement
should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for
mounting a new offensive
2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or,
indeed, as a result of a lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should
be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.
3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a
unified, independent, democratic, sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on
free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages,
from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be
made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government
4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim
arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration
of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.
5. As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up
an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United
Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity
with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter,
of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of
representation of China in the United Nations.
Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, p. 210.
FOOTNOTES
'Chiao Kuan-hua, The New York Times, November 16, 1971.
2James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), pp. 244-245.
'The Communists have already recognized certain agreements concluded by the Nationalist
government during World War II: the 1942 Declaration of the United Nations, the 1943 Cairo
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